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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
WILL STATES BE ALLOWED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS?
I. Introduction
The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress and proposed to
-the states on March 22, 1972.' Despite the fact that seven years is allowed for
ratification, many states acted quickly and ratified the amendment without much
,debate or consideration. Six states ratified within one week of Congress's submission of the amendment to them and by the end of the summer of 1972 a
total of eighteen states had ratified the amendment. ' To date thirty states have
ratified it; thus only eight more states need ratify in order for it to become part
of the United States Constitution.'
After a more thorough examination of the effects that this amendment might
have and despite prior ratification, several states have considered rescinding
their ratifications. The only state to successfully complete a rescission resolution,
however, has been Nebraska, which initially ratified the Equal Rights Amendment on March 29, 1972, exactly one week subsequent to its passage by Congress.' By a 31 to 17 vote, the Nebraska State Legislature directed its Secretary
of State to send a resolution to Congress withdrawing their prior ratification as
of March 15, 1973." Since there is pressure within other states to attempt withdrawals of hasty ratifications6 and since the amendment is close to being ratified
by the requisite three-quarters of the states, the validity of Nebraska's rescission
and any that are to follow may play a vital role in the life of this amendment.
In light of these facts, this note will examine the two basic questions involved in any state's attempt to withdraw its ratification of an amendment:
1) whether the states have the power to rescind under the Constitution; and
2) whether a controversy concerning the validity of rescission is justiciable; i.e.,
is it a political question? Recent case law is sparse but the area is not without
precedents. This article will examine those precedents and construe them in
light of more recent decisions such as Baker V. Carr.' Thus, a historical and
chronological approach will be taken toward the subject. The law to date convincingly rejects any power within the states to rescind prior ratifications and
1

CONG.

REc.: H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNo. REc. S. 4612 (1972).

Text of the amendment at U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1972).
2 The first eighteen states to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment are: Hawaii (March
22, 1972), Delaware (March 23, 1972), New Hampshire (March 23, 1972), Idaho (March
24, 1972), Kansas (March 28, 1972), Nebraska (March 29, 1972), Tennessee (April 4, 1972),
Rhode Island (April 14, 1972), New Jersey (April 17, 1972), Texas (April 19, 1972),
Colorado (April 21, 1972), Iowa (April 21, 1972), West Virginia (April 22, 1972), New
York (May 3, 1972), Michigan (May 22, 1972), Maryland '(May 26, 1972), Massachusetts
(June 21, 1972) and Pennsylvania (September 26, 1972).
3 The final twelve to have ratified the amendment are: Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. 1 WomEN's RIGHTs LAw REPORTER 104 (1973).
4 See note 2, supra.
5 1973 NEB. LAws 1547 (Leg. Res. No. 9 adopted by 83d Leg., 1st Sess., March 15,
1973).
6 Michigan, for example, is one state that attempted to pass a rescission resolution. In
other states, a reassessment of public opinion, urged mainly by anti-Equal Rights Amendment
groups, is taking place.
7 369 U.S. 186 '(1962).
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asserts that such controversies concerning ratifications can and should be handled
by the courts.
II. The Power of States to Rescind Their Previous Ratifications of
a Constitutional Amendment

A. The Civil War Era
Immediately following the Civil War, the problem of rescission appeared
in connection with the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. New Jersey
and Ohio attempted to withdraw their ratifications of that amendment and
Secretary of State Seward was unsure whether their ratifications could be
counted.8 Congress, however, passed a resolution accepting their ratifications in
addition to those of South Carolina, Georgia, and North Carolina who had
rejected the amendment and then subsequently ratified it.0 Following these
actions by Congress, White v. Hart ° was decided by the Supreme Court. In
that case, which concerned the validity of the Georgia Constitution, the Court
acknowledged the finality of states' ratifications of constitutional amendments.
The result [Georgia Constitution] was submitted to Congress as a voluntary
and valid offering, and was so received and so recognized in the subsequent
action of that body. The State is estopped to assail upon such an assumption [that submission of the Georgia Constitution was coerced by Congress].
Upon the same grounds she might deny the validity of her ratification of
the constitutional amendments."
The fifteenth amendment also presented a rescission problem. This time
New York attempted to withdraw its ratification and again Congress counted
the state as among those who had ratified." No attack was made upon
Congress's action since New York's ratification was not essential because the
requisite number of state ratifications had already been obtained.
Some commentators tend to dismiss the actions concerning the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments as products of the unusual temper of their times and
suggest that they may not be valid authority today." The opinion in the
Slaughter-House Cases,' however, handed down two years after the fifteenth
amendment was adopted, recognized the consternation of the times, but did not
hesitate to construe the fourteenth amendment and thus implicitly assumed its
validity. Even recently, when the fourteenth amendment has been challenged
as unconstitutionally ratified, the courts have upheld the finality of states' ratification of that amendment despite the rescissions of New Jersey and Ohio and the
8 15 Stat. 707 (1868).
9 15 Stat. 709 (1868).
10 13 Wall 646 (1871).
11 Id. at 649.
12 16 Stat. 1131 (1870).
13 Bondfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MncH.
L. Rav. 949, 967 n.70 (1968); Corwin and Ramsey, The ConstitutionalLaw of Constitutional
Amendment, 26 NOTr. DA n LAwYER 183, 201-06 (1951); Grinnell, Petitioning Congress
for a Convention: Cannot a State Change Its Mind?, 45 A.B.A.J. 1164 '(1959).
14 16 Wall. 36 (1872).
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corruption and military control of the times. 5 Following the Civil War, then,
it was assumed by Congress and the courts that the states had no power to withdraw their ratifications.
B. Leser and Coleman
Leser v. Garnett" was a suit brought against the Board of Registry of
Maryland to disenfranchise two women despite the adoption of the nineteenth
amendment. It was charged that, because of procedural irregularities in West
Virginia and Tennessee, these two states had not successfully ratified the amendment, causing the amendment to fail for lack of the requisite three-quarters of the
states. Despite the states' non-adherence to their own procedural law, the Supreme
Court determined that their ratifications were final and conclusive. If ratification occurs in accordance with the Federal Constitution, the state may not deny
its validity because of irregularities within their own system."
In Coleman v. Miller 8 a problem similar to the one in Leser was presented.
Members of the Kansas legislature sought a judgment nullifying a ratification of
the Child Labor Amendment after passage of the ratification resolution. They
argued that a prior rejection of the amendment by the legislature precluded the
subsequent ratification. In response to this argument the majority stated:
Thus the political departments of the Government dealt with the effect
both of previous rejection and of attempted withdrawal and determined
that both were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification. 9
In addition, the opinion pointed out that the Constitution mentions only ratificadon and not rejection when discussing the states' role in the amending process.2"
The act of ratification terminates the state's function while prior rejection is not a
bar to subsequent ratification. Although neither Leser nor Coleman handled the
question specifically, they both indicated that the states are without power to
rescind.
C. Analogous Situations
Since the Coleman decision, the effect of ratifications, rejections, and
rescissions in relation to federal constitutional amendments has not been an
important issue. There have been, however, a few cases which effectively consider the state's role in other federal contexts. These cases reflect a judicial concern for attributing finality to ratifications by states upon which other states or
the federal government must depend.
In West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,2 ' the subject of the suit was an eight
15 United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); Negrich v. Hohn, 246
F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
16 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
17 Id. at 137.
18 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
19 Id. at 449.
20 Id. at 447, 450.
21 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
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state compact to stop pollution in the Ohio River which had been approved by
Congress. West Virginia's legislature had originally ratified the compact but the
state courts had found it to be in violation of the West Virginia Constitution.
The Supreme Court would not allow West Virginia to withdraw from the
compact. The majority opinion held that since Congress must assent to all
interstate compacts and since suits in which several states conflict must be decided
in federal courts, the compact and West Virginia's State constitution must be
interpreted according to federal law.22 The Court construed the state constitution as not being in conflict with the compact thus denying West Virginia the.
power to withdraw from the agreement." Had the compact been in violation of
the state constitution, though, it seems evident from the concurring opinions.
that West Virginia still could not have withdrawn.2" Cases citing Dyer, such as.
State of Nebraska v. State of Iowa," reveal that the Supreme Court has retained
for itself the power to determine the validity of interstate compacts. Conflicts
with state law (as in Leser) will not justify rescinding a ratification which is in
accordance with federal law.
In United States v. Brown" and Omaha Tribe of Nebraska u. Village of
Walthilly the validity of Nebraska's ceding of jurisdiction over an Indian tribe
to the federal government was in question. In Brown a criminal defendant
claimed that Nebraska violated its own procedural laws when it retroceded
jurisdiction and thus that he could not be prosecuted by the federal government
since the retrocession was invalid. The court did not agree. They used Dyer
and Leser to support their holding that, despite state procedural inconsistencies,
a resolution by a state such as this retrocession, if valid according to federal law
and accepted by Congress, is final. When a situation arises in which the federal
government has superior authority or a legitimate interest like Indian affairs, it
may accept state resolutions as valid which otherwise may be invalid." Omaha
Tribe involved an attempt by Nebraska to rescind the same resolution. Again
citing Leser, the Court held the rescission to be ineffective. The opinion pointed
out that the federal government cannot be charged with investigating alleged
discrepancies between state action and state law.
Federal law must control
because attributing finality to state action within a federal context is extremely
important.
22 Id. at 28.
23 Id. at 32.
24 Both concurring opinions expressed a need for finality in the ratification of compacts:
After Congress and sister states had been induced to alter their positions and bind
themselves to terms of a covenant, West Virginia should be estopped from repudiating
her act. For this reason, I consider that whatever interpretation she may put on
the generalities of her Constitution, she is bound by the Compact, and on that basis
I concur in the judgment. Id. at 36 (Jackson, J., concurring).

25
26
27
cert.
28
29

Since the Constitution provided the compact for adjusting interstate relations, compacts may be enforced despite otherwise valid state restrictions on state action. Id.
at 34 (Reed, J., concurring).
406 U.S. 117 '(1972).
334 F. Supp. 536 (D. Neb. 1971).
334 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1972),
denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
334 F. Supp. at 539-41.
334 F. Supp. at 831-32.
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The compact and state resolution situations indicate that withdrawal by a
state from a previous commitment has often been denied by the courts. The
amending of the United States Constitution is a function in which the federal
government exercises more control over the states than either the compact or
resolution situations and, therefore, state procedural irregularities would seem
even less of a reason to allow rescission in that area. Finality is necessary in the
ratification process in order to avoid uncertainty concerning the status of an
amendment; and federal law, specifically the Federal Constitution, must be the
only standard by which the validity of a ratification is measured if we are to have
a consistent ratification process. Within this framework, rescission based only
upon a state's change of mind would appear to be equally unacceptable if not
more unacceptable than a rescission based on conflicts within state law.30
D. Related Considerations
Most of the literature concerning rescission has been generated by past
attempts to call a nationwide constitutional convention. The tax proposal of the
1950's and the Dirksen Anti-Reapportionment Amendment of the 1960's are
the most recent examples. Debates have centered on the possibility of a state
rescinding its resolution calling for a constitutional convention with rescission of
amendment ratifications discussed as a collateral or analogous issue." In general these commentators, although some were proponents of the states' power to
rescind applications for a constitutional convention, realized that ratifications
of amendments should be treated as more permanent acts than convention resolutions.
Ratification is the fina act by which sovereign bodies confirm a legal or
political agreement arrived at by their agents. Applications for constitutional
conventions, however, are merely formal requests by state legislatures to
Congress, . . .. 2 (emphasis supplied)
Applications for a convention do not command the same respect or represent a
similar need for finality as do the ratifications of amendments.
Other writers have looked to the Constitution in order to determine if there
is a power to rescind. 3 They argue that the Constitution gives states the power
to ratify but not the power to cancel that ratification; thus ratification should
be seen as the expiration of all state power, an idea implicitly mentioned in
Coleman?4 One writer has gone so far as to contend that withdrawal of
ratifications disrupts the amending process in the same manner as a withdrawal
30 There has been no allegation that Nebraska violated state procedure when it ratified
the Equal Rights Amendment.
31 See Bondfield, supra note 13; Fensterwald, Constitutional Law: The States and the
Amending Process-A Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717 (1960); Giliam, Constitutional Conventions:
Precedents, Problems, And Proposals, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 46 (1971); Grinnell, supra note 13;
Martin, The Amending Power: The Background of the Income Tax Amendment, 39 A.B.A.J.
124 (1953); Packard, ConstitutionalLaw: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J.
161 (1959).
32 Bondfield, supra note 13, at 967; see also Fensterwald, supra note 31, at 719.
33 Martin, supra note 31, at 127; Packard, supra note 31, at 162.
34 See note 20, supra.
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of consideration of the amendment from the states by Congress 5 Implicit within
these assertions is a recognition that finality in, the ratification process is necessary
if we are to avoid uncertainty concerning an amendment until the last day. 6
The main concern of those supporting the states' power to rescind is that
amendments be ratified sufficiently contemporaneously to demonstrate the will
of the entire country at one time. They argue that rescission promotes contemporaneity in that it allows states to show their current attitude toward the
amendment." However, it has been noted that all past amendments have been
ratified within a relatively short period of time38 and since the 1921 decision of
Dillon v. Gloss,"a the seven-year limitation period has always been considered
reasonably short to suggest contemporaneity. The Equal Rights Amendment
itself has a similar seven-year ratification limit but it has taken only a year and
a half for thirty states to ratify it. Although rescission would perhaps allow reflection of current attitudes more accurately, the price of uncertainty and instability would be too high to pay. State legislatures, such as Nebraska's, could
change their minds in every legislative session or every time there is a change in legislative personne. 4 Proper consideration of the amendment the first time would
defeat most desires to rescind, and if the mood of the country really has changed
drastically, ratification in the remaining needed states will certainly be defeated.
It is always possible to hypothesize that a state ratifying within the first year may
have genuinely reconsidered and changed its mind by the time the amendment
is finally passed, especially if passage comes in the sixth year. But simultaneous
ratification is not possible and if we are to maintain order in the system, seven
years, the period within which Congress has deemed it reasonable to amass the
required votes, must be seen as sufficiently contemporaneous.
Legal precedent militates against allowing states to rescind their ratifications
of a constitutional amendment for any reason except a determination by the
courts that the ratification has violated the federal laws. An unconstitutional ratification is easy to imagine. Ratification by state referendum would seem to be
clearly unconstitutional and possible of being held invalid by the courts.4' In the
absence of like circumstances, however, rescission by a state on its own motion
must be considered invalid by Congress and the courts.
III. Is Rescission A Political Question?
A. The Standing Issue -

A Brief Note

Establishing standing, of course, would be a crucial threshold consideration
of any suit concerning constitutional amendments. Thorough treatment of the
35
36

Packard, supra note 31, at 161-62.
See Martin. supra note 31, at 167.
37 L. ORPIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 72 (1942); Bondfield, supra
note 13, at 958-66; Buckwalter, Constitutional Conventions And State Legislators, 48 CHI.KENT L. RFv. 20, 28 (1971); Fensterwald, supra note 31, at 719-20; Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. R~v. 1067, 1074 (1957).
38 Bondfield, supra note 13, at 965.
39 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
40 Nebraska ratified the Equal Rights Amendment in its 82d Leg., 2d Sess. and rescinded
in the 83d Leg., 1st Sess.
41 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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issue would comprise a law review article in itself. It is worth noting, however,
that state senators who originally voted for ratification would seem to have standing to challenge any rescission resolutions on the basis that an invalid rescission
nullifies the effect of their vote. It was so held in Colema 42 and in a more recent
case, Petusky v. Rampton.4 3 The Coleman majority based their position on
Leser in which qualified voters were said to have standing to challenge the ratification of the nineteenth amendment because state law allowed suits against the
state Board of Registry."' Where one is injured in a general way, however, such
as a taxpayer challenging the ratification of an amendment, merely being a
member of the class without further involvement has been held insufficient to
establish standing.45 Women, as a class or individually, may be viewed as having
that "further involvement" in the Equal Rights Amendment situation since unconstitutional rescissions may deny them rights they otherwise would obtain.
In any event, finding a state representative willing to initiate a suit would not
seem to be a difficult task and it appears certain that he would have standing.
B. State's Role in the Amending Processas a FederalFunction
Ever since Hawke v. Smith the act of ratification, although performed by
individual states, has been viewed as a federal function.46 In that case ratification
was determined to be an expression of assent rather than an act of legislation
thus denying states control over the process. Since the power to ratify is derived
from the Federal Constitution, the states may not substitute their own method of
ratification for that prescribed by Congress." Two years later Leser specifically
followed Hawke on this point;"8 and in the 1930's there were two decisions which
held that the tenth amendment was no barrier to federal control of the ratification process49 and one decision which pointed out that, unlike ordinary state
legislation, the governor of a state cannot participate in the ratification of amendments.5" More recently in Trombetta v. State of Florida,5 a district court, citing
the combined effect of Hawke and Leser, declared void an attempt by Florida
to withhold consideration of United States constitutional amendments until a
majority of its legislature's members had been elected subsequent to the submission of the amendment. The court reasoned that action of the kind contemplated would be unconstitutional state interference with a federal function.
Since states are performing a federal function, the question arises concerning
which branch of the federal government has the responsibility of regulating the
states in the exercise of this function. It is well settled that Congress can
determine the mode of ratification (ratification by state legislatures or conven42 307 U.S. at 438.
43

307 F. Supp. 235, 250 (D. Utah 1969).

44

307 U.S. at 439-41.

45 Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd per
curlam, 391 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).

46 253 U.S. at 230.
47 Id. at 229.
48 258 U.S. at 137.
49 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 '(1931); United States v. Thibault, 47 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1931).
50 Smiey v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
51 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D.Fla. 1973).
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tions within the states) 5" and that Congress can prescribe a reasonable time
period within which ratification must occur.53 But which branch of government
can decide the constitutionality of ratifications and rescissions, Congress or the
courts? This is a question that has either been left unanswered in the past or has
been answered in a dubious fashion. It is also a question whose answer may
lead a court to term a controversy concerning the constitutionality of rescissions
as "political." If the issue of validity of rescissions is committed exclusively to
Congress, it would violate the separation of powers doctrine (of which the
political question doctrine is a function) 54 for the courts to consider the question.
In order to determine the role, if any, the judiciary is to play in this controversy,
it is necessary to look at past judicial attitudes toward the amending process and
re-evaluate them in light of new cases and the political question criteria expressed
in Baker v. Carr.
C. Before Coleman:

An Active Court Involved in the Amending Process

The earliest case concerning the amendment area was Hollingsworth v.
Virginia.5 5 In that case the Court determined that the President had no role
in the amending process. Despite his veto power over ordinary legislation, he
could not directly affect the proposal or adoption of amendments.
The Civil War era, despite the difficulties with the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, did not produce any cases directly concerning the amending process
but the White v. Hart opinion implied that the Court could hear challenges concerning the ratifications of amendments.56 One commentator has noted that
despite the fact that Congress's decisions were never challenged directly during
this period, it should not be assumed that they would not have been justiciable.5
Considering the questions of ratification and rescission as political was never
suggested at the time.
In the 1920's and early 1930's, the Supreme Court handled a variety of
cases concerning the amending process. From 1920 to 1922 the Court decided
that: 1) Ohio could not use a referendum vote to ratify the eighteenth amendment;5" 2) the 2/3 vote required in each house of Congress to propose an
amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present, assuming presence
of a quorum, and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire Congress;59 3) ratification
must occur within a reasonable time since proposal of an amendment and ratification are so closely related;6" and, 4) restrictions of state law cannot affect
52 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
53 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
54 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
55 3 Dali. 378 (1798).
56 13 Wall. at 649. The opinion assumed that the Georgia Constitution was submitted as
a voluntary offering thus Congress could accept it and it could not be withdrawn just as
Congress could accept ratifications that were voluntary and deny withdrawal. However, if the
state's action was explicitly forced by Congress, the submission of the Constitution would not
be effective. "Congress has no power to supersede the National Constitution." It would seem
then, that, if Congress exceeded its authority in accepting an invalid Constitution or ratification, its action could be challenged in the courts.
57 Clark, The Supreme Court and the Amending Process, 39 VA. L. REv. 621, 645 (1953).
58 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
59 The National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
60 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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2 made
the ratifying process."' In addition, in 1931, United States V.Sprague"
clear that the Congress, pursuant to its Article V powers, has the power to choose
the method of ratification by the states.
All these decisions, from Hollingsworth to Sprague, reflect a desire on the
part of the Supreme Court to clarify the amending process and to establish a
procedure for ratification that is constitutional. It is significant that in interpreting the constitutional requirements for the amending process that they went
so far as deciding the proper number of votes needed within Congress to propose
an amendment, an area which would appear to be controlled by Congress to a
greater extent than the ratification process. Some writers have attempted to distinguish these cases, however, by noting that they are all decided against those
challenging the ratifications.6 3 This does not diminish the fact that they were all
decided on the merits and not dismissed as political questions.64 It must be
observed that before Coleman the courts did not hesitate to decide questions
concerning the amending process.

D. Coleman
In Coleman two central questions were asked: whether a state can ratify
an amendment following a rejection of it and whether a state can ratify an
amendment thirteen years after it has been proposed. The Court ruled that both
questions were political but the different treatment given the two questions reveals that the Court's analysis was inconsistent and erroneous.
In connection with the rejection-ratification issue, the Court recounted the
history of the Civil War Amendments and concluded that Congress had always
decided this issue; therefore, it must be a political question." They considered
precedents holding ratification to be final, but ultimately they refused to decide
the question. As mentioned before, Congress did decide this issue immediately
following the Civil War but it was not suggested that the courts were excluded
from considering it. Furthermore, the Coleman majority completely ignored
the cases of the 1920's and 30's dealing with the amending process. These cases
had firmly established the Supreme Court's role in defining constitutional amending procedure but the majority made no effort to distinguish them. This led
one observer to comment that: "Reference shows that Coleman v. Miller is contrary to most precedent, and supported by none, on this issue."6
The issue of the timeliness of ratification was discussed in a different fashion.
Two standards were established to determine if this was a political question: 1)
were there sufficient criteria for a judicial decision? and, 2) was it appropriate
to attribute finality to a decision of a political department of government?6 7 The
61 Leser v.Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
62 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
63 Bondfield, supra note 13, at 978 & n.118; Gilliam, supra note 31, at 51; Scharpf,
JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALa, L.J. 517, 588 n.247
(1966).
64 See Wolf, An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52
A.B.A.J. 326, 328 (1966).

65 307 U.S. at 448-50.
66 Clark, supra note 57, at 646.
67 307 U.S. at 453-54.
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Court decided that the issue was too complex and concerned factors, such as
the mood of the country, which were unable to be effectively determined by the
judiciary. Thus the congressional acceptance of ratification could not be
examined. In making this decision, the Court failed to overrule Dillon where
the Court had previously determined seven years to be a reasonable time for
ratification and where the door was left open for judicial review of whether
ratification had come within a reasonable time.6" A concurring opinion realized
that the majority, by not overruling Dillon, may have implicitly assumed a power
of judicial review in this matter and it dissented from any such implication. 9
Although the majority may have been remiss in not effectively distinguishing
Dillon when deciding the timeliness of ratification issue, at least they considered
some reasonable criteria in connection with determining whether this issue was
a political question. The cursory look at history which was the sole criterion for
the rejection-ratification issue is at best unsatisfying and rebuttable." The uncertain reasoning of the opinion coupled with the advent of new criteria for the
political question doctrine delineated in Baker v.Carr will certainly cause Coleman to be overruled if and when it is challenged.
E. Baker v. Carr -

Coleman v. Miller Rendered Ineffective

Baker v. Carr is the leading case on the political question doctrine. Within
the majority opinion, six criteria were formulated by which a court could determine if a question is political. To understand whether the questions before us
would be considered political, it is necessary to test them against these criteria
because "[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,
there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political
question's presence."71
The initial test is whether there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Central to deciding whether the validity of rescission is a political question, therefore, is a determination whether Congress alone is given power to control the ratification process. This in itself requires a delicate interpretation of the Constitution by the
courts. 2 In light of past Supreme Court decisions prior to Coleman it appears
that both Congress and the courts must play a role in the ratification process.
Substantial Supreme Court precedent supports this view and indicates that
68
69

70
71
72

Id. at 452.
Id. at 458 (Black, J., concurring):
There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon v. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless
ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement.
See Orfield, supra note 37, at 20.
369 U.S. at 217. All six criteria are listed on the same page.
Id. at 211:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.
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at least some of the procedural questions which may arise in the amending
process can be settled on the merits by the judiciary.7 3
Congress, by virtue of Article V, is given the power to choose the method of ratification by the states (state legislatures or conventions within the states) and
Dillon construed the Constitution as allowing Congress to determine a reasonable
time within which ratification must occur; 4 but this does not diminish the Supreme Court's role as "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."75 The constitutionality of a state's action or procedure in connection with the amending
process must be decided by the courts, even if their decision only affirms the
constitutionality of action taken by Congress, since this function of constitutional
interpretation has been committed to them. "The effect of rejection is very
much the sort of question which the Court habitually decides, since it arises out
of an interpretation of the Constitution.""0
In the same vein, the second criterion, "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," presents no problem since the standard by which a rescission resolution is measured is the Constitution itself. The question of the
timeliness of ratification is not analogous here since that question may involve
an assessment of the present attitude of the country towards the amendment for
which there is a lack of criteria readily discoverable by the judiciary.7 Whether
state action conformed to the Constitution, however, would require only a consideration of history and an interpretation of that document, a task which the
court is well-equipped to perform.
In addition, the important policy consideration, the need for finality balanced against the need for contemporaneity, is not "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Questions such as this one must be considered as inextricably intertwined with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Powell v.
McCormack offers an example. In this case, the Court was confronted with
the suggestion that in deciding whether Congressman Powell could be excluded
from the House it was granting itself the power to interfere with the internal
business of Congress. The Court responded by pointing out that:
[A] determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more
than interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within
the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not
involve a "lack of the respect due [a] coordinate [branch] of government,"
nor does it involve an "initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" (citation omitted). Our system of government requires
that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at
variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The
alleged conflict that such adjudication may cause cannot justify the court's
avoiding their constitutional responsibility (citation omitted) .78
73 Bondfield, supra note 13, at 978.
74 See notes 52 and 53, supra.
75 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); see also, note 72, supra.
76 Clark, supra note 57, at 645.
77 But see Orfield, supra note 37, at 19-20 and Clark, supra note 57, at 648; both authors
argue that deciding upon a reasonable time within which to ratify an amendment is no more
difficult than judging state statutes by due process and other fourteenth amendment criteria.
78 395 U.S. at 548, 549.
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Analogously, the Court's policy determination in a rescission case would revolve
around interpreting whether the Constitution dictates finality or contemporaneity
as the more important consideration in the amending process.
Powell v. McCormack also establishes that the Courts may construe the
constitutional limitations of congressional authority in an area which is assumed
to be under congressional control without "expressing a lack of respect due
coordinate branches of government." The National Prohibition Cases which
decided what constituted the two-thirds vote within Congress necessary to propose amendments, displayed a similar role for the courts. 9 In light of these cases,
construing the validity of a state's rescission would not seem to demonstrate disrespect towards Congress either. A case on point is Hoellen v. Annuzio ° where
it was asserted that a determination of whether the franking privilege had been
misused by a member of Congress was a political question. A statute regulating
this privilege needed to be interpreted so the court felt the political question
doctrine was not a deterrent to judicial review.
The mere fact that this statute purports to regulate the conduct of Members
of Congress does not, without more, take it outside the bounds of proper
judicial scrutiny. For this court to construe this statute no more involves a
lack of respect due the Congress, . . . than the construction of a statute not
involving the conduct of Congressmen. 81
The Constitution also regulates the acts of Congress and the states. A judicial
decision delineating the power of the states to rescind or the power of Congress
to accept that rescission is a necessary result of judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
Finally, it is evident that there is no need for "adherence to a political decision already made" since the political decision to rescind is the source of this
controversy. It is that decision itself whose constitutionality must be decided.
"The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."82 Furthermore, there is no "potential of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question," because a decision by the Supreme Court that the issue is not "textually demonstrable" within the power
of Congress would preclude action by that body on the question. The central
concept to all six criteria as applied to the rescission issue is the realization that
the Supreme Court can and must interpret the Constitution. As noted in Powell,
possibilities that other branches of the Government might disagree with the
Court's decision must not deter the Court from acting.
Baker and the cases following it mark a significant retreat from Coleman.
By establishing workable criteria for judging what is a political question, Baker
has effectively limited the potency of Coleman's scant view of history. "Baker
should also permit a return from the deviation in Coleman to the line of cases
that have considered without hesitation the validity of ratification of constitu79 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
80 348 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
81 Id. at 312.
82 369 U.S. at 217.
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tional amendments."8 3 This is not to say that the political question doctrine has
gone unnoticed recently. It has been used considerably by the courts to facilitate
an avoidance of judicial review of cases involving foreign affairs. But, in the
future it appears that this doctrine will not frustrate judicial review of the validity
of ratification or rescission of constitutional amendments.
[lhe Court will not usually apply the doctrine to the constitutional guarantees of individual rights and to conflicts of competence among the departments of the
84 federal government and between the federal government and
the states.
A suit concerning rescission, then, may be the catalyst the Court needs to finally
overrule Coleman by applying the Baker criteria to similar facts.
IV. Conclusion
In a rescission case the courts may find Petusky v. Rampto 85 to be a useful model. Petusky is a district court case which was eventually reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on jurisdictional grounds;8" but despite
its reversal, the district judge's reasoning offers a possible approach to the problem.
The subject of dispute in Petusky was a resolution passed by Utah's legislature, which had been determined in a prior case to be unconstitutionally apportioned, calling for a convention to propose antireapportionment amendments.
A state senator sought to have the resolution declared unconstitutional because
the state legislature was seeking to perpetuate its own unconstitutional existence
by passing this resolution. The district judge agreed. In a prelude to his holding,
he noted that historically the Supreme Court has determined the validity of
ratifications8 7 and that any attempt to alter the Constitution must be effected
consistently with current constitutional requirements.88 Thus, exercise of the
judicial power to interpret the Constitution becomes essential. After reviewing
the facts, the opinion concluded that the resolution was unconstitutional and
that Congress cannot be compelled by invalid resolutions. An order was given
directing the Secretary of State of Utah to request the return of the resolution
from Congress.89
Although the Petusky case involves a convention resolution, which does not
command the same respect as ratifications, a similar procedure could be followed
by the courts in a rescission case. If the courts are to handle this issue properly,
they must realize the need for constitutional interpretation, recognize the unconstitutionality of rescission, and prepare a holding which will effectuate their
decision. Issuing an order to a state may foreclose any possibility of animosity
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Wolf, supra note 64, at 329.
Scharpf, supra note 63, at 587.
307 F. Supp. 235 (D. Utah 1969).
431 F.2d 378 (l0th Cir. 1970).
307 F. Supp. at 250.
Id. at 251, 257.
Id. at 256-57.
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being displayed by Congress." It would also seem possible to handle the issue
as a declaratory judgment, thus foregoing the need for any form of injunction.
In any event, a clear and definitive statement on the rescission issue and
its political question aspects is needed if we are to avoid uncertainty concerning
the status of the Equal Rights Amendment and of any future amendments raising
the same questions. Presently, the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment may be
determined by the court's answers to these questions. The law is clearly on the
side of those in favor of the amendment; any suits should produce a nullification
of rescissions and, consequently, cause states to consider the merits of amendments
more astutely before undertaking the irrevocable act of ratification.
Raymond M. Planel

90

Gilliam, supra note 31, at 57:
Here may be the solution of the problem that Orfield noted as being unanswered in
Coleman v. Miller, that is, where and when the Court would deal with questions
as to the amendatory procedure. While the Court might hesitate in assuming direction over Congressional action in the process, it might not be as reluctant with
reference to the action of the States.

